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(iii) 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GMW CONSTRUCTION, 
A Partnership, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs 
ROBERT WAYNE COX, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Civil No. 870160-CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
Jurisdiction of this Court is founded under Section 
78-2a-a, Utah Code Annotated and under Rule 3 of the Rules 
of Utah Court of Appeals, as the appeal arises from a final 
judgment or order of the Eleventh Circuit Court, and for 
Carbon County, State of Utah, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for the collection of money and 
foreclosure of a mechanic's lien and counterclaim for 
damages to personal property. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Complaint was filed and served on or about October 1, 
(1) 
1985. Answer and Counterclaim was filed and served on or 
about October 17, 1985. Pre-Trial was had on June 25, 1986 
and Order thereon was entered July 9, 1986. Trial was 
had on January 28, 1987 before the Honorable A. John Ruggeri, 
Circuit Court Judge. 
The Court entered it's Memorandum Decision on February 
3, 1987. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
were entered on March 27, 1987. 
Appellant filed Notice of Appeal on or about April 27, 
1987. 
C. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
The trial court found in favor of defendants on their 
counterclaim and against Plaintiff on its Complaint and 
pursuant to its final order dated March 27, 1987, awarded 
judgment in favor of Defendants in the sum of $4,154.83 plus 
$725.00 as and for attorney's fees and costs in the amount of 
$10.00 for a total of $4,989.83 together with interest at 12% 
per annum until paid. 
D. FACTS 
[All facts as set forth by Appellant are disputed]. 
Respondents hired GMW to replace the firebrick and reface 
their fireplace which was equipped with a heatilater and was 
the only source of heat for their home (TR-59,1.15,16). 
Prior to hiring Appellants, Respondents purchased two pallets 
of red brick and firebrick (TR-60,1.22,23). 
(2) 
Appellant contends the contract was for material and 
labor. Respondents contend that contract was for labor only 
(TR-63.1.24,25) and that it was agreed that GMW would 
return the red brick that Respondents purchased a change 
them for rock for a small additional charge (TR-64,1.10»25)• 
Appellant contends that the fireplace was "condemned" 
(TR-115,1.18,23) but that they were only hired to give 
the fi
 a cosmetic face lift (TR-7,1.25, TR-8,1.1). 
Appellants' chief witness, Lynn McCourt, is not a 
licensed cci _tor (TR-23,1.3,10), Mr. McCourt did not 
on the interior of the fireplace (TR-25,1.5). 
The size and shape of the firebox was changed by 
Appellants (TR-14,1.6) and when they finished the heatilator, 
that fit in the old firebox, was to big for the 
reconstructed firebox (TR-119, 1.13,17). Mr. Counsel had 
not seen the fireplace in question (TR-119, 1.23,24). 
Appellants testimony that Respondents* home was dirty 
was rebutted by photographic evidence to the contrary. 
(Ex. 29,30,31). 
Appellant McCourt1s testimony that he moved furniture, 
covered the floor and cleaned up following completion of 
the job was rebutted by witnesses Cox (TR-66,1.1,13) and Mrs. 
Langley (TR-97,1.10,11). 
Mrs. Cox testified that an oak mantle was removed from 
the fireplace and taken by GMW (TR-78,1.14,15). Appellants 
( 3 ) 
claim that the mantle piece was made of plywood and that it 
was thrown away (TR-29,1.15,16)• 
Mrs. Cox testified that one year prior to the incident 
she purchased a Television Set for $596.00 and a coffee table 
for $248.00 (TR-67,1.20,22). There was no objection to 
her testimony nor was it rebutted. She testified that the 
television set and table were damaged by flying chips of 
cinderblock (TR-67, 1.13) and by the pipe of one of the 
workman (TR-66,1.22,25, TR-67,1.1,2). 
Appellant McCourt testified that they did in fact break 
rock inside the home. (TR-30,1.4,7). 
Mrs. Cox testified to damage to her carpet 
(TR-68,1.8,18; Ex. 19,20) and her testimony was supported 
by Appellant McCourt (TR-16,1.24,25; TR-17,1.1,14) She 
testified that replacement cost was $573.28 (TR-77,1.11,19) 
There was no objection to this testimony. 
Mrs. Cox testified that, after waiting for two or three 
days for the mortar to dry, her husband lit a fire, that the 
fireplace would not work and the house was smoke damaged 
(TR-70,1.15,23). This testimony was corroborated by Mr. Cox 
(TR-91,1.22,25; TR-92,1.1,6); witness, Langley 
(TR-97,1.21,25) and witness Jennings (TR-106,1.12,23, 
Ex.10,21.25). Mr. Cox testified further that cleaning 
and painting expenses were over $500.00 (TR-73,1.8,12). 
(4) 
There were no objections from Appellants' counsel who also 
stipulated that evidence of expenses for drapes and curtains 
be submitted to the court subject to counsel's right to 
to request further hearing (TR-123,1.24,25; TR-124,1.1,25; 
TR-125,1.1,4). Evidence was submitted and there was no 
request for further hearing. 
Appellant McCourt testified that $3,500.00 was a 
minimum amount to reconstruct the fireplace (TR-32,1.6,7)• 
Witness, Counsel testified that $4,000.00 "on up" was 
the cost to reconstruct (TR-45,1.17,18). 
Mrs. Cox testified that at 10:30 P.M. on the night the 
fireplace was lighted she called Appellant Gomez, at his home 
to advise him of the problem (TR-73,1.13,17) and that within 
one week following the completion of the work the mortar was 
falling out and cracks were appearing in the fireplace 
(TR-78,1.23,25; TR-79,1.1,25; Ex.17,27,18). 
Appellant McCourt knew of Respondents' complaints within 
one week of completion of the work (TR-58,1.11,12). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There was, as the Trial Court found, sufficient evidence 
to support the Court's decision. 
The Court of Appeal is precluded from hearing issues 
raised for the first time on appeal. 
(5) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHETHER TRIAL COURT ABUSED IT'S DISCRETION BY 
AWARDING DAMAGES BASED ON EVIDENCE PRESENTED, 
At trial of the case at bar the Court found from the 
evidence that Appellants' work on Respondents' fireplace 
caused damage to Respondents' home and personal property. 
(Addendum 1,2), 
Appellants challenge the Courts findings based 
on the fact that there was conflicting testimony and that, 
in Appellants' view, their witnesses had more expertise. 
Appellants conclude that the evidence was not "substantial" 
and did not support the judgment. 
The same argument was the issue on appeal in 
Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P2d 233, (Utah 1983), cited by 
Appellant in support of their argument. The Utah Supreme 
Court said in Kinkella: 
Plaintiff argues that he presented 
irrefutable evidence that defendants 
inflated the labor and material costs. 
Plaintiff also claims that the trial 
court attached insufficient weight to 
the testimony of plaintiff's expert. 
The trial court heard the witnesses 
of both parties first-hand, evaluated 
detailed written audits by both sides, 
and concluded that plaintiff's evidence 
was not as convincing as defendants' 
evidence. On appeal we do not retry 
(6) 
the facts and will not overturn the 
trial court's findings of fact if th< 
supported by substantial evidence.... 
[Citations Omitted] at 235. 
This standard of review has been refined and expa* 
the recent criminal case decided by the Utah Supreme Court 
which said: 
On January 1, 1987, however, new Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) took 
effect, providing: 
In all actions tried upon the facts 
specially and state separately its 
conclusi* f law thereon, and judgment 
shall be ^m.i-ved pursuant to Rule r ° * * 
Findings of fact, whether based on -. i 
or docunu evidence, shall not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due 
regard shall be given to the opportunity 
of the trial court to judge the y 
of the witnesses..... 
The language of Rule 52(a) is similar 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Federal case law has defined the standard 
of review in the federal rule and Wright 
& Miller summarizes that standard as 
follows: 
[I]t is not accurate to say that the 
appellate court takes that view of the 
evidence that is most favorable to the 
appellee, that it assumes that all 
conflicts in the evidence were resolved 
in his favor, and that he must be given 
the benefit of all favorable inferences. 
All of this is true in reviewing a jury 
verdict. It is not true when it is 
findings of the court that are being 
reviewed. Instead the appellate court 
may examine all of the evidence in the 
record. It will presume that the trial 
court relied only on evidence properly 
admissible in making its findings in the 
(7) 
absence of a clear showing to the contrary. 
It must give great weight to the findings 
made and the inferences drawn by the trial 
judge, but it must reject this findings if it 
considers them to be clearly erroneous. 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedures, Section 2585(1971)(Citations 
Omitted]. [Emphasis Added].1 
Appellant in his narration of "fact" and review of 
the testimony favorable to his position merely highlights 
conflicting testimony and asks this Court to accept his 
version as true and disregard the evidence relied upon by 
the Trial Court in reaching it's decision. This approach 
was declined by the Utah Supreme Court in Hal Taylor 
Associates v. Union America, Inc., 657 P2d 743, (Utah 1982): 
...Where the evidence is in 
conflict, we defer to the trial court's 
first-hand assessment of the witnesses' 
credibility and assume that the trial 
court believed those aspects of the 
evidence which support its findings. 
[Citations Omitted] at 749. 
Counterclaimants were competent to testify as to cause 
and amount of damage. 
The Trial Court in it Memorandum Decision outlined the 
findings which supported the Court's decision. (Addendum 7). 
Rule 701 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that 
lay testimony is admissible if the layman's inferences or 
opinions are rationally based on the perception of the 
1. State v. Walker, 64 Utah Adv. Rep.10 (Utah 1987); 
c.f., Kohler v. Garden City, 639 P2d 162 (Utah 1981); 
Charleston v. Hackett, 360 P2d 176 (Utah 1961); 
Dugan v. Jones, 39 Utah Adv. Rep.37 (Utah 1986) 
(8) 
u and are helpful to a clear understanding of his 
testimony or to a determination of the fact in issue. 
(Addendum 3). Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence provid 
experts may testify but does not provide for any situation 
in which such testimony is mandatory. (Addendum 3). 
In Roods v. Roods, 645 P2d 640, (Utah 1982), tt 
Supreme Court held that lay opinion was proper even though 
expert testimony would be admissible with respect tc 
issue. 
In the case at bar, Respondents were in a n 
to observe and perceive their damages; when and h 
occurred. 
Appellant's witness, Mr. Counsel, had n e 
fireplace in question. (TR-119,1.23,24). Appellant who 
testified regarding said fireplace was not a li'*-^  ^ <?d 
contractor (TR-23,1.3,10) nor did he work on the 
of the fireplace (TR-23,1.21,23). 
Respondents were certainly in a better position to 
o! he malfunction of the fireplace and the result 
o d malfunction; as well as the damage to their 
ca, ^ . ^. and furnishings. 
All competent evidence tending 
to establish a legitimate item 
of damage is, under proper pleadings, 
relevant and admissible. Evidence 
tending to show the extent of the 
damages as a matter of just and 
(9) 
reasonable inference has been held 
admissible where the fact of damage 
has been proved, and where, because 
of the nature of the case, the 
amount of the damages cannot be 
estimated with certainty, or only 
a part of the damages can be so 
estimated, evidence of all the facts 
and circumstances of the case have 
any legitimate tendency to show the 
damages or their probable amount may 
be admitted for the purpose of enabling 
the trier of the facts to make the most 
accurate and probable estimate which 
the nature of the case permits. 
[Citations Omitted]2 
While there are some inherent 
qualifications in the rule and 
variations of phraseology in its 
statement, the general rule supported 
in nearly all jurisdictions, in criminal 
as well as civil cases, is that an 
owner of a chattel, although not 
an expert on the subject, is qualified 
by the relationship of owner to give 
his opinion as to its value. The 
primary reason for admitting such 
an estimate of value is that of 
necessity, the owner necessarily 
knowing something about the quality, 
cost, and condition of the article, 
and it often being impossible to 
produce other witnesses having the 
requisite knowledge upon which to 
base an opinion. But the rule of 
admissibility is more frequently 
predicated on the presumption that 
the owner, being familiar with his 
property, knows what it is worth. 
It thus appears that familiarity 
on the part of the owner with the 
chattel involved is a condition 
precedent or inherent predicate 
to the admission in evidence of a 
2. 25 A C.J.S. Damages Section 145,p.27. 
(10) 
nonexpert owner's opinion as to 
value...[Citations Omitted]3 
Respondents testified to the amount of damage to their 
property. There was no objection to nor rebuttal of said 
testimony. 
Rule 301, Utah Rules of Evidence provides follows: 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling* 
Error may not be predicated 
upon a ruling which admits or 
excludes evidence unless a 
substantial right of the party 
is affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the 
ruling is one admitting evidence, 
a timely objection or motion to 
strike appears of record, stating 
the specific ground of objection, 
if the specific ground was not 
apparent from the context; or 
Appellants' witnesses testified that $3,500.00 or 
$4,000.00 would be the cost of reconstruction of the 
fireplace (TR-32,1.6,7) and (TR-45,1.17,18). Therefore, 
the Trial Court's conclusion that $1,500.00 would compensate 
for damage to the fireplace was not unreasonable. The 
Court obviously did not believe Appellant McCourt's testimony 
that the fireplace mantle in an old home was made of plywood. 
The measure of damage to personal property was set 
forth; allowing replacement cost as admissible evidence, in 
the Utah Court of Appeals decision rendered July 10, 1987, 
Ault v. Dubois, 61 Utah Adv.Rep. 35: 
3. 31 Am.Jur. 2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence, Section 137, 
p.682-683. 
(11) 
...[C]ost of replacement may-
have been the only evidence 
available for the jury in 
determining the fair market value 
of the destroyed items. And the 
desired objective of damages is 
ftto evaluate any loss suffered by 
the most direct, practical and 
accurate method that can be 
employed." [Citing Even Odds, Inc. 
v. Nielson, 22 Utah 2d 49, 448 P.2d 
709, 711 (1968).] Moreover, Dubois 
did not introduce any other evidence 
to prove the fair market value of the 
damaged property... 
As in Ault, Appellant herein offered no evidence of fair 
market value. 
In this case, as in Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 
261, 409 P2d 121, (Utah 1965): 
The parties have had what they 
were entitled to: a full and fair 
opportunity to present their contentions 
and the evidence supporting them to the 
court [and jury]. When this has been 
done all presumptions are in favor 
of the validity of the [verdict and] 
judgment, at 125. 
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to 
4 
Respondents, the established standard for appellate review, 
5 
this Court should sustain the decision of the Trial Court 
and deny Appellants' request, on appeal, for a new trial. 
Although the evidence was disputed and reasonable people 
4. Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P2d 693 (Utah 1982). 
5. McCloud v. Baum, 569 P2d 1125 (Utah 1977); Egbert & 
Jaynes v. R.C. Tolman, supra; n.3, citing Charlton v. 
Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 389; 360 P2d 176, (1961) and URCP 
59 (a)(6), Addendum 15,p.l). 
(12) 
might arrive at different conclusions, the issues were 
decided by the Court. That decision should not be 
disturbed on appeal. 
POINT II 
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEAL IS PRECLUDED FROM 
ADDRESSING ISSUES NOT RAISED AT THE TRIAL LEVEL. 
Appellant did not raise the issue of sufficiency 
of the evidence at any time during the trial. It is obvious 
that the issue of sufficiency of evidence, if any, would 
have been apparent to Appellant at the close of Respondents' 
case. It was not raised. 
Appellant now raises the issue of sufficiency of the 
evidence for the first time. 
The Court has held in Barson v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, 
Inc., 682 P2d 832, (Utah 1984): 
In order to preserve a contention 
of error on appeal, the party 
claiming error in admission of 
evidence must raise the objection 
the trial court in clear and concise 
terms and in a timely fashion calculated 
to obtain a ruling thereon. Where there 
was no clear and definite objection... 
that theory cannot now be raised on 
appeal Therefore, we are 
precluded from addressing this assertion 
of error on the merits, at 837,[citing 6]. 
6. U.R.E. 4; Cook Assocs. Inc. v. Warnick, Utah, 664 P2d 
1161, (1983). State v. Malmrose, Utah 649 P2d 556, 
(1982). Franklin Financial v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 
P2d 1040, (Utah 1983). 
(13) 
Barson deals with timely objection to admissibility of 
evidence. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently held: 
"...The rule has been stated over 
over again that a party may not 
remain silent and take his chance on 
a verdict and then, if it is 
adverse, complain of some inadequacy 
which could have been quite easily 
corrected. See Susser v. Wiley, 
1944, 350 Pa. 427, 39 A.2d 616; 
Rastmus v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 1949, 
164 Pa. Super. 635, 639, 640, 67A. 2d 
660; Stadham Co. v. Century Indemnity Co., 
1950, 167 Pa. Super 268, 275, 74 A. 2d 
511..." Bodine v. Boyd, 383 Pa. 525, 119 
A. 2d 54, 276. 
The issues raised on this appeal were or should have 
been apparent to Appellant at the close of the trial. They 
were not raised. Appellants chose to await the decision, 
which did not weigh in their favor before raising the issues 
on appeal. 
Appellants argument in favor of reversal of the decision 
below should not be heard. 
CONCLUSION 
Judgment and Order of the Trial Court should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
1ARIYNN/BENNETT LENA 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS 
ROBERT WAYNE COX AND RONI COX 
(14) 
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(15) 
A D D E N D U M 
IN THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
O0o 
GMW CONSTRUCTION, 
a partnership, 
plaintiff 
-vs-
ROBERT WAYNE COX 
and RONI COX, 
defendants 
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 
The Court makes the following findings of fact: 
1. That the fireplace in question was operational and in use 
as the only source of heat at the time plaintiffs undertook repairs. 
2. That the work done by plaintiffs resulted in structural 
modification of the fireplace as well as cosmetic 
3. That plaintiffs installation and repair of the firebrick 
and the "heatalator" was the direct cause of the malfunction of 
the fireplace. 
4. That plaintiffs in cutting and fitting the rock and masonry 
work allowed chips and rock particles to damage the defendants 
television set and other furniture pieces. 
5. That plaintiffs removed and destroyed an existing oak mantel 
belonging to the defendants. 
6. That plaintiffs faulty construction/alteration is the direct 
cause of the damages incurred by defendants, as follows: 
Damage to TV Tuner and Furniture $596.00 
Damage to Drapes and Walls 620.55 
Cleaning and Painting 500.00 
Repair and Cleaning of Carpet 583.28 
Oak mantel destroyed 325.00 
Replacement costs for Fireplace 1,500.00 
Memorandum of Decision Continued: 
7. That the pre-trial order provided for attorneys fees, and 
the Court fixes defendants attorneys fees at $725.00. 
8. That plaintiffs returned, for credit, 100 red brick at 
3<£ each for a total of $30.00, which amount belongs to defendants. 
The Court makes the following Conclusions of Law: 
1. That defendants are entitled to judgment in the amounts 
indicated in the findings, together with costs and attorneys fees. 
2. That plaintiffs lien is not valid and must be released 
forthwith. 
Dated this 3rd day of February, 1987. 
J-tma 
-AW 
REET 
4501 
) 
<^A/[axLunn 2D. J-zma 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 1 9 3 3 
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(8011637-2690 
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ROBERT WAYNE COX 
RONI COX 
222 N o r t h 2nd E a s t 
P r i c e , Utah 84501 
IN THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR 
PRICE, CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GMW CONSTRUCTION, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
A P a r t n e r s h i p , CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
P l a i n t i f f , : 
v s : 
ROBERT WAYNE COX : 
and RONI COX, 
D e f e n d a n t s . : C i v i l No. 85-CV-104 
T h i s m a t t e r came on f o r t r i a l on t h e 8 t h day of J a n u a r y , 
1987 and P l a i n t i f f was p e r s o n a l l y p r e s e n t i n Cour t and r e p r e s e n t e d 
by C o u n s e l , Nick Sampinos , and D e f e n d a n t s were p e r s o n a l l y p r e s e n t 
i n Cour t and r e p r e s e n t e d by C o u n s e l , Marlynn B e n n e t t Lema, and 
t h e Cour t h a v i n g h e a r d t e s t i m o n y and h a v i n g r e c e i v e d e v i d e n c e and 
b e i n g f u l l y a d v i s e d i n t h e p r e m i s e s and h a v i n g e n t e r e d i t s 
Memorandum D e c i s i o n h e r e b y f i n d s a s f o l l o w s : 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. T h a t t h i s Cour t h a s j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
B. JUma 
f AT LAW 
IN STREET 
AH 84501 
r-2690 
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2. That the Court finds in favor of Defendant on their 
Counterclaim and against Plaintiff on their Complaint* 
3. That the fireplace in question was operational and in 
use as the only source of heat at the time Plaintiffs undertook 
repairs. 
4. That the work done by Plaintiffs resulted in structural 
modification of the fireplace as well as cosmetic changes. 
5. That Plaintiffs installation and repair of the firebrick 
and the ffheatalatortf was the direct cause of the malfunction of 
the fireplace. 
6. That Plaintiffs cutting and fitting the rock and masonry 
work allowed chips and rock particules to damage the Defendants 
television set and other furniture pieces. 
7. That Plaintiffs removed and destroyed an existing oak 
mantle belonging to the Defendants. 
8. That Plaintiffs faulty construction/alteration is the 
direct*cause of the damages incurred by Defendants, as follows: 
Damage to TV Tuner and Furniture $ 596.00 
Damage to Drapes and Walls 620.55 
Cleaning and Painting 500.00 
Repair and Cleaning of Carpet 583.28 
Oak Mantle destroyed 325.00 
Replacement costs for Fireplace 1,500.00 
9. That the pre-trial order provided for attorneys fees, and 
the Court fixes Defendants attorneys fees at $725.00. 
10. That Plaintiffs returned, for credit, 100 red brick at 
3 cents each for a total of $30.00, which amount belongs to 
Defendants. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
concludes as follows: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That Judgment should be awarded as against Plaintiff 
and in favor of Defendants in the amount of $4,154.83 plus $725.00 
as and for attorney fees and costs b,f Court in the amount of 
$10.00 for a total of $4,989.83 same to bear interest at the rate 
of 8% per annum until paid. 
DATED this J*/ day of February, 1987. 
. JOHN RUGGERI 
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
5. Jjtmxx 
TLAW 
STREET 
184501 
590 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 1 9 , 3 3 
248 EAST MAIN STREET 
PRICE. UTAH 84501 
(801)637-2690 
ATTORNEY FOR: 
DEFENDANTS 
ROBERT WAYNE COX 
RON I COX 
222 N o r t h 2nd E a s t 
P r i c e , Utah 84501 
IN THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR 
PRICE, CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GMW CONSTRUCTION, 
A P a r t n e r s h i p , 
O R D E R 
P l a i n t i f f , 
vs 
ROBERT WAYNE COX 
and RON I COX, 
D e f e n d a n t . C i v i l No. 85-CV-104 
5. Jlima 
TLAW 
STREET 
184501 
J90 
This ^ matter came on for trial on the 28th day of January, 
1987 before the Honorable A. John Ruggeri, Circuit Court Judge, 
and the Plaintiff was personally present in Court and represented 
by Counsel, Nick Sampinos, and Defendants were personally 
present in Court and represented by Counsel, Marlynn Bennett Lema, 
and the Court having heard testimony and having received evidence 
and being fully advised in the premises and having entered its 
Memorandum Decision and having entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, Now Therefore, 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. That Judgment i s hereby awarded as a g a i n s t P l a i n t i f f and 
in favor of Defendants i n the amount of $4,154.8.3 p lus $725.00 
as and for a t t o r n e y fees and costs- of Court i n the amount of $10. OC 
for a t o t a l of $4 ,989.83 same to b e a r i n t e r e s t a t t he r a t e of 8% 
per annum u n t i l p a i d . 
DATED t h i s c ^ _ d a y of February , 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
JOHN RUGGERI 
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT 
NICK SAMP IN 05 
ATTORNEY FOR7 PLAINTIFF 
UTAH C O D E 
1*7 1988 Utah Rules of Evidence! RULE 705t 
(b) Scope of cross-examination. 
Cross-examination should be limited„ fa j the 
robject matter of the direct examination and matters 
iffecting the credibility of the witness The court 
may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry 
into additional matters as if on direct examination. 
(c) Leading questions. 
Leading questions should not be used o n \ the 
direct examination of a witness except as may be 
necessary to develop his testimony. Ordinarily 
leading questions should be permitted on cross-
examination When a party calls a hostile witness, 
as adverse party, or a witness identified with an 
adverse party, \ interrogation may be by leading 
questions. 
IULE 6TZ. WRITING USED TO REFRESH 
MEMORY> 
If a witness uses a writing to refresh his memory 
for the purpose of testifying, either 
(1) while testifying, or 
(2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion 
determines it is, necessary in the interests of justice? 
an adverse party is entitled to have the writing pro-
duced at the hearing, to inspect it, to cross-
mmme the witness thereon, and to introduce in 
evidence those portions which relate to the testi-
mony of the witness. If it is claimed that the writing 
contains matters not related to the subject matter of 
the testimony the court shall examine the writing in 
camera, excise any portions not so jrelated, and 
order delivery of the remainder to the party entitled 
thereto. Any portion withheld over objections shall 
be preserved and made available to the appellate, 
court \n the event of an appeal. \l 4 writing h 'not 
produced or delivered pursuant to order under this 
rule, the court shall make any order justice requires, 
except that in criminal cases when, the prosecution^ 
elects not to comply, the order shall be one striking 
the testimony or, if the court in its discretion dete-
rmines that the interests o f justice so require, decl-
aring a mistrial. 
IULE 613. PRIOR STATEMENTS OF 
WITNESSES. 
(1) Extmlnlttf witness concerning Prior statement. 
(I) Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement of 
witness. 
(a) Examining witness concerning prior statement. 
In examining a witness concerning a prior state-
ment made by him, whether written or not, the 
ttatement need not be shown nor its contents discl-
osed to him at that time, but on request the same 
shall be shown pr disclosed to opposing counsel 
(b) Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement 
of witness. 
Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent state-
ment by a witness is not admissible unless 'the* 
witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or 
deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an, 
opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the int-
erests of justice otherwise require. This provision 
does not apply to admissions of a party-opponent 
sidelined in Rule 801(d)(2), 
IULE 614. CALLING A N D INTERROGATION 
OF WITNESSES tyf COURT. ^ „ * ,
 >% A l 
WCaUlBi a* c«wf. /fc ^ j , ^ f . ^ , / +\^it%c\^m, 
( i ) Calling by court. 
The court may, orj its own motion pr at the) sug-> 
gestion of a party, call witnesses, and all parties ftre 
entitled tp cross-examine witnesses thus called 
(b) Interrogation by court. 
The court may interrogate witnesses, whether* 
called by itself or by a party. 
(c) Objections. 
Objections to the calling of witnesses by the court 
or to interrogation by it may be made at the time pr 
at the next available opportunity when the jury is 
not present. 
RULE 615. EXCLUSION OF WITNESSES. 
* At the request of a party the court shall order 
witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the tes-> 
jimony of other witnesses, and it may make the 
order of its own motion. This rule does not autho-
rize exclusion of (1) a party who is a natural person, 
or (2) an officer or employes of a party which Is not 
a natural person designated as its representative by 
its attorney, or (3) a person whose presence is showft 
by a party to be essential to the presentation of his 
cause. 
ARTICLE V n . OPINIONS A N D EXPERT 
TESTIMONY 
Rule 701. Opinion Testimony by Ls;y Witnesses. 
Bute 702. Testimony by Experts. 
pule 703 Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts. 
Rule 704. Opinion on Ultimate Issnt. 
Role 705. Disclosure of Facts or D*t* Underlying Expert 
Opinion. 
Rule 706. Court Appointed Experts, 
[UM^O^ OPINION TESTIMONY BY LAI 
^WITNESSES. 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his 
testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is 
limited to those opinions or inference? which are (a) 
rationally based on the perception of the witness 
and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his test-
imonyj>r the determination of a fact in issue. 
[ j U L E ^ > T E S T I M O N Y BY EXPERTS. 
if scientific, technical, or other specialized knd* 
wledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experi-
ence, training, or education, may testify thereto' iij 
the forth of an opinion or otherwise, 
RULE 703. BASES OF OPINION TESTIMONY 
BY EXPERTS. 
The facts or data in the particular case Upon 
which an expert bases an opinion or inference, may 
be those perceived by pr made known to hiro at or 
before the hearing. If pf a type reasonably relied 
upon by experts in the particular field in forming 
opinions or inferences upon tl>e subject, the facts, qt 
data need not be admissible in evidence. 
RULE 704. OPINION ON ULTIMATE ISSUE 
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference 
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it 
embraces an ultimate issue $0 be decided by the frier 
of fact. 
RULE 705. DISCLOSURE OF F^CTS OR D A T A 
UNDERLYING E X f ERT OPINION. 
The expert may testify in terms of opjnjori or, 
inference and give his reasons therefor without prior 
disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless th$* 
C0D£*Q> 
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